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  - 1 - Abstract: 
We study a problem of rental rate pricing and rental contract designing in aircraft 
leasing industry. In a framework of Stackelberg game, the system is composed of an 
airline company (carrier) and an aircraft leasing company (lessor). Acting as the leader, 
the lessor announces daily rental rates and/or provides long-term contracts on a finite 
horizon with multiple periods. For each period, the carrier determines the aircraft leasing 
number to adjust the flight capacity, and applies a dynamic pricing policy for air-tickets 
based on a seasonally stochastic demand and some economic factor, such as oil price. We 
find the optimal policies for both lessor and carrier through a dynamic program approach. 
Then, we consider a “forward-like” long-term contract in this paper. The lessor 
provides an identical rental rate if the carrier promises to rent a pre-determined number of 
aircraft on the whole horizon. Applying an appropriate long-term contract, the lessor can 
make more money from a large required leasing number. The carrier can improve 
performance from providing additional flights. Meanwhile, the customers enjoy more 
flight service. We are able to obtain the optimal contract design and the associated 
optimal policies for the entire system.  
In the future research, we will study more flexible contracts for the carrier and lessor to 
improve the profit and share the risk. 
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  - 2 - 1. Introduction  
1.1 The emergence of aircraft leasing industry 
Over the years, air travel has come to play a more prominent role in economic 
development as air transportation usage increased worldwide. In fact, historical analysis 
of transportation trends has showed that the role of air travel as a transportation mode 
will keep increasing in the future since people tend to shift to faster and more expensive 
transportation modes, such as air transportation, as their income increases. 
Commercial airlines use their fleets of aircraft to transport passengers and cargo 
around the world. The aircraft are a significant and essential component of their business 
and great care is taken in matters related to these aircraft. Periodically it is necessary for 
an airline to acquire or rent new aircraft in order to expand their business or to replace 
older units which may no longer be safe or economically viable to operate. The decision 
making process for determining what type and what quantity of aircraft to obtain is often 
complex. Each different aircraft type has its own capabilities and characteristics which 
may or may not make it suitable for a given airline or route. Especially a new aircraft will 
likely be in service for 20 or more years and the purchase price for aircraft and the 
operating expenses associated with them are very high. Then the industry begins to 
consider the aircraft leasing topics to cut the expensive cost for obtain a new aircraft. 
    First used in the mid-1970s by ILFC, an aircraft lessor, the aircraft leasing became 
popular in the mid-1980s after airline deregulation in the United States and Europe. In the 
initial stages, operating lessors were mainly buying surplus second-hand aircraft from 
carriers and leasing them to other carriers, particularly those with poor access to debt and 
equity markets. In the mid-1980s, lessors started to acquire new aircraft directly from 
  - 3 - manufacturers and also entered into sale-leaseback transactions with carriers. As a result, 
today, almost all airlines use operating leases as a component of their capital structure, 
and most of all operating lessors’ purchases of new aircraft have a designated lessee at 
the time of the order.  
    Till now, about one third of the aircraft currently operated by major carriers are under 
an operating lease: a rental contract between a lessor and an airline for use of the aircraft 
for a short period (mainly 4-5 years). GECAS—the largest lessor, a unit of General 
Electric Company —today owns approximately 1200 aircraft. As a means of comparison, 
the largest carrier in the world, American Airlines, operates around 800 aircraft. 
1.2 back ground knowledge of aircraft leasing 
Before we approach to the research about aircraft leasing contract, it is necessary for us 
to add some basic knowledge about aircraft leasing here. 
1.2.1 The concept of leasing 
Leasing is defined as a contract between a lessor and a lessee where the lessor provides 
the lessee with the right to use assets, property owned by the lessor. The contract is 
usually for a specified period of time, referred to as the ‘the lease term’-for which the 
lessee is obliged to pay a stream of rental payments as agreed to between the lessor and 
the lessee. Generally, a lease contract may not be cancelled by either party unless certain 
terms and conditions specified in the contract trigger its termination (e.g., non-payment, 
bankruptcy). A lease contract may however grant an early termination option on a 
specific date with or without penalty for various predetermined reasons. At the expiry of 
the lease term, the lessee is usually required to return the asset to the lessor, unless the 
lessor provides an option to the lessee to purchase of the asset. A purchase option price is 
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depending on the type of lease. 
1.2.2 Capital leasing and operating leasing 
   The two basic types of lease—the operating lease and the capital lease—have important 
differences. Generally speaking, if ownership of the leased asset is transferred to the 
lessee at the end of the lease term following payments that represent the full value of the 
asset, it is a capital lease; other wise, it is an operating lease. The precise classification 
changes slightly for legal, taxation, and accounting purposes, but the main idea is that the 
greater the extent to which the lessee acquires control and residual claims on the asset, 
the more likely it is that the lease is classified as a capital lease. 
    In the United States, conventional criteria used for lease classification include: 
(1) Transfer of ownership:  
        If a lease contract has the provision of ownership transfer of the asset, it is 
classified as capital lease. It refers to the legal ownership in the lease contract which 
can be easily implemented in practice. 
(2) Bargain purchase option:  
A bargain purchase option is a provision allowing the lessee to purchase the leased 
property for a price that is significantly lower than the property’s expected fair value 
at the date the option becomes exercisable. At the inception of the lease, the 
difference between the option price and the expected fair market value must be large 
enough to make exercise of the option reasonably assured. If there is a bargain 
purchase option in the lease contract, it is recognized as capital lease. 
(3) Economic life: 
  - 5 -     If the lease period equals or exceeds 75% of the assets economic life, most of the 
risks and rewards of ownership are transferred to the lessee, and the capitalization is 
therefore appropriate. The lease term is generally considered to be fixed, non-
cancelable term of the lease. 
(4) Recovery of investment: 
If the present value of the minimum lease payments equal or exceeds 90% of the 
fair market value of the asset, then the leased asset should be capitalized. The 
rationale for this test is that if the present value of the minimum lease payments is 
reasonably close to the market price of the asset, the asset is effectively being 
purchased. 
    In this paper, we will focus on the operating leasing. The reasons include operating 
perspective, contract design period, practice in industry, etc. More detailed explanations 
will be offered in next section. 
1.3 The academic research of aircraft leasing 
The airline industry is one of the most successful examples of applying operations 
research methods and tools for the planning and scheduling of resources. Optimization-
based decision support systems have proven to be efficient and cost-saving for the 
scheduling of aircraft and crew, not to mention the short term rescheduling problems, 
where modifications to the initial plans are required before the final schedules can be 
executed. 
On the other hand, leasing contracts are extensively used in capital-equipment markets, 
and leasing is one of the major sources of financing for firms. In fact, 80% of U.S. 
companies lease capital equipment. Of the $668 billion spent by American businesses on 
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Equipment Lease Foundation. Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) report that 
operating leases, capital leases, and debt are42%, 6%, and52% of fixed claims, 
respectively, in the1981-1992 data. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) document that leasing is 
the largest source of external finance for small firms. In a typical lease contract, the 
owner of the asset (the lessor) grants to another party (the lessee) the exclusive right to 
use the asset for an agreed period of time, in return for periodic payments. Hence, the 
lessee takes the risks and returns from the use of the asset, and the lessor takes the risks 
and returns from ownership of the asset. As in any financial contract, the risk of default 
by the lessee is a primary element in the risk of ownership, with the liquidation value of 
the asset playing a key role if the lessee defaults. Especially, lease of aircraft has become 
an increasingly important tool for the airline industry. 
    While in academic area, there is little research on leasing contract design, especially 
for some certain cases. The benefits of lease were traditionally viewed as financial. Gritta 
et al. (1994) examined the role of lease as sources of off-balance-sheet financing. As 
operating lease is not capitalized, carriers can substantially lower their debt/equity ratio 
on their balance sheet if they finance their aircraft fleet by leasing rather than by 
traditional debt. Another well-known financial benefit is that leasing separates the 
ownership of an aircraft from the aircraft's user. Therefore, it is the lessors who own the 
aircraft while the carrier operate the aircraft. This separation of ownership enables 
valuable depreciation allowances to be used more effectively by the lessors for tax 
purposes. Indeed, in certain international leasing arrangements, when the lessors and the 
airlines belong to different tax regimes, it was reported that depreciation allowances were 
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“double dip”. 
        It may be argued that the effect of off-balance-sheet financing is largely cosmetic 
because financial analysts would not be fooled when it is publicly known that an airline 
has taken up a substantial lease obligation. Indeed, Marston and Harris (1988) 
demonstrated, using a large sample of US firms, that lease and debt are substitutes as it 
would under efficient financial markets. Results from a survey study by Bayliss and Diltz 
(1986) also showed that bank loan officers reduce their willingness to lend when a firm 
takes up lease obligations. Therefore, lease as source of off-balance-sheet financing does 
not appear to be able to significantly increase firms’ debt capacity. Furthermore, with 
increasingly stringent accounting and tax rules, the tax effects of lease are also limited. 
Now, the major attractions of operating lease of aircraft are viewed as more operational 
than financial in nature. First, while the aircraft manufacturers currently have substantial 
order backlogs, major aircraft leasing companies have inventories for immediate delivery. 
Hence, airlines desiring a quick expansion need not wait for the production backlogs. 
Second, short-term operating lease provides the flexibility to the airlines so that they can 
manage fleet size and composition as closely as possible, expanding and contracting to 
match demand. 
While significant use of operating lease affords the airlines the flexibility to change 
aircraft fleet size as demand for air transport changes, it created a burden to the leasing 
companies to maintain efficient utilization of their inventory of aircraft. In a recession, 
when demand for aircraft is low, the leasing companies will also suffer from excess 
capacity. Indeed, the last recession was devastating to dozens of leasing companies when 
  - 8 - demand and aircraft values dropped. In essence, through the flexibility of operating leases, 
the airlines shifted part of their business risks to the leasing companies. However, 
although short-term operating lease reduces the risks of excess capacity for the airlines, it 
does not eliminate uncertainties in the financial costs. During recession, when costs of 
short-term leasing are low, airlines have little incentive to expand their fleet. On the other 
hand, during the booming period, when the airlines need the capacity most, the costs of 
leasing will also be highest. Thus the operating lease provides a vehicle which enables 
the airlines and the leasing companies to share the risks of uncertain demand. For the 
airline industry which faces a cyclical demand, this risk-sharing aspect of operating lease 
is highly desirable. Needless to say, the aircraft leasing companies are in the business for 
profits. They purchase aircrafts from the manufacturers by means of long-term financing, 
and then lease the aircraft to the airlines. For short-term operating lease, it would take at 
least two or more lease transactions on an aircraft for the leasing companies to recover 
the costs. Therefore, the expected revenues from operating lease must not only cover the 
long-term financing costs of the aircraft, but also provide the leasing company with a 
profit (premium) adequate to compensate for the risks involved with aircraft release and 
residual value. 
To the carriers, optimal use of operating lease then presents the problem of a trade-off 
between operational flexibility and higher financial costs inherent in the short-term lease. 
The historical trend has been an ever-increasing use of operating lease, in tandem with 
the development of an active aircraft leasing market. Now, with the market becoming 
mature, whether airlines should continue to increase reliance on operating leases has 
become a strategic question to the fleet management of the airlines. 
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Operating lease of the aircraft gives the airlines flexibility in capacity management. 
However, airlines pay a risk premium to the leasing companies for bearing part of the 
risks. Therefore, the airlines face a trade-off between flexibility of capacity and higher 
costs.  
More details, we can list the three main incentives for aircraft leasing here, and which 
are the key points we want to study in this paper. 
(1) Risk transfer 
    The airline industry is traditionally cyclical, with large swings, and the waves have 
greater swings recently. The figure1 and 2 show the trends of airlines’ net profit in 
these years. Hence, both airline profits and aircraft values carry substantial financial 
risk, and they are almost perfectly correlated. Leasing allows carriers to transfer some 
of the aircraft-ownership risk to operating lessors. And lessors are better suited to 
assuming the risk of aircraft ownership through their specific knowledge of the 
markets, their economies of scale, and their broader diversification of aircraft types and 
lessees operating in different geographic regions. Moreover, the largest lessors 
(GECAS and ILFC) belong to large financial conglomerates, which allow them to 
diversify the aggregate risk of aircraft ownership and to have a lower cost of funds, 
thanks to a higher credit rating. 
(2) Flexibility 
    As an example, GECAS cites the following benefits of an operating lease: “Fleet 
flexibility to introduce new routes or aircraft types” and “Flexibility to increase or 
reduce capacity quickly.” In exchange for operational flexibility, lessors require a 
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such leases provide makes up for the fact that the cash costs of the leases can be 
greater than the cost of acquiring the same aircraft through ownership. 
(3) Price discounts 
    In  most  cases,  lessors’  scale  enables  them to extract price discounts from the 
manufacturers by purchasing a large number of aircraft, which means they can pass 
part of these savings to lessees, and smaller carriers find that particularly attractive. 
Here in our model, we study a problem of rental rate pricing and rental contract 
designing in aircraft leasing industry. In a framework of Stackelberg game, the system is 
composed of an airline company (carrier) and an aircraft leasing company (lessor). 
Acting as the leader, the lessor announces daily rental rates and/or provides long-term 
contracts on a finite horizon with multiple periods. For each period, the carrier 
determines the aircraft leasing number to adjust the flight capacity, and applies a dynamic 
pricing policy for air-tickets based on a seasonally stochastic demand and some economic 
factor, such as oil price. We find the optimal policies for both lessor and carrier through a 
dynamic program approach. 
Then, we consider a “forward-like” long-term contract in this paper. The lessor 
provides an identical rental rate if the carrier promises to rent a pre-determined number of 
aircraft on the whole horizon. Applying an appropriate long-term contract, the lessor can 
make more money from a large required leasing number. The carrier can improve 
performance from providing additional flights. Meanwhile, the customers enjoy more 
flight service. We are able to obtain the optimal contract design and the associated 
optimal policies for the entire system. In the future research, we will study more flexible 
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some gap about aircraft leasing applied in OM area by investing this contracts design 
problem. 
The structure of the paper is as below:  
The first section is the introduction about the aircraft leasing problem, together with a 
brief description of the problem we want to investigate. In section 2, we list the literatures 
about this topic and specially three most relative papers to our study; the section 3 
explain the main assumptions and settings we will use in this paper, including the choice 
of pricing policies, demand characters, and parameter’s setting, for example, the identical 
size of aircrafts. The base model is formulated in section 4, and we will list all the 
notations and obtain some basic but important characters about the information of 
optimal solution. The key part of this paper, section 5, will propose a forward-liking 
contract which is used between carrier and lessor in order to reach the win-win. We will 
provide both of the advantage and disadvantage of this contract which will be produced 
in application, in addition to the proof process. A sensitive analysis is provided in section 
6 and we will test our result’s robustness given different basic parameter’s value. As the 
final part, in section 7, there is the conclusion of this paper and expectations for future 
research. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Airline revenue management 
        Airline revenue management is the first relative literature area to our paper. To 
increase total revenue and in an effort to better match the demand for each flight with its 
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flight (differential pricing). Much of the rationale for price differentiation lies not in 
discrimination but rather in the different costs of serving passengers associated with 
different requirements. A leisure traveler who is willing to book well ahead when seats 
are more readily available is less expensive to accommodate than a business traveler who 
demands flexibility. Business passengers will often need to book a flight shortly before 
the departure, in the event of an expected business meeting, for example. Therefore 
airlines are obliged to have seats available at the last minute for a number of business 
travelers. This result in lower load factors on days when the actual demand is lower than 
expected and must be accounted for when pricing different products. Fares thus must 
reflect the cost of providing different degrees of flexibility, even in economy class. 
Offering different fare products is also inevitably derived from the nature of airline 
market segmentation. 
Revenue management is therefore the practice of determining the number of seats to be 
made available at each fare level, limiting low-fare seats and protecting higher-fare seats 
for late-booking passengers. The airline market has several niches, each with specific 
customer features. As a consequence, the price structure on a competitive route is not 
very transparent. The evolution of RM systems has traced the development of RM 
practices; the first of such systems appeared in the 1980s and mainly relied on 
overbooking (as described in Thompson (1961) and Littlewood (1972)) so as to increase 
revenue. A complete literature review dealing with revenue management and related 
problems can be found in Barnhart, Belobaba and Odoni(2003) and McGill and van 
Ryzin(1999). 
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    The second stream of related research focuses on the analysis of contract design. Fisher 
and Raman (1996) show how demand forecasts can be improved by utilizing up-to-date 
demand information. Our results show how spot trading can help improve the supply 
chain performance while aggregating different pieces of private information that are 
dispersed among competing participants. Anupindi and Bassok (1999) and Mahajan and 
van Ryzin (1999) show that in a setting where competing retailers’ market shares are 
determined by their inventory levels, the retailers overstock and supply chain 
coordination suffers. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) examine the role of an internal 
market in coordinating the supply chain. They find that when a central agent whose goal 
is maximizing supply chain profits can set (near) linear transfer prices; the supply chain 
can be coordinated. This coordination is based on the intervention of a benevolent agent 
and does not result from independent market forces. Corbett et al. (2004) investigate 
various two-part tariff contracts under a one-supplier; one-buyer setting where the 
buyer’s cost is private information. Their study focuses on supplier-initiated contracts and 
evaluates the value of information for the supplier. In their article, the supplier does not 
know the buyer’s internal variable cost; however, they do not consider supplier or buyer 
investment decisions to influence the demand through higher quality or selling efforts, 
respectively. In line with their article, we observe that as the information gap about 
retailer type increases, the flexibility provided by using transfer fees is reduced. However, 
we also note that the manufacturer may prefer the fixed-fee contract over the general 
franchise menu contract (two part tariff contract) under certain conditions. In a paper with 
retailer selling effort, Krishnan et al. (2004) consider the effect of retailer promotions on 
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coordinate the channel as buy-backs reduce the incentive for retailer’s promotional 
efforts. As such, they suggest using buy-backs coupled with promotional cost-sharing 
agreements when effort cost is observed in order to coordinate the channel. Other 
coordinating mechanisms for the case of observable (but not verifiable) demand, and for 
the case of verifiable demand are also discussed. 
Especially for rental industry, Bayiz and Tang (2004) develop an integrated planning 
system for a dosimeter service company that is based on deterministic demand and return 
processes. This planning system is designed to help the firm to manage inventory in an 
effective manner by taking the return process into consideration. Other work that relates 
to the rental industry tends to concentrate on the analysis of the revenue sharing scheme. 
Dana and Spier (2001) show that the revenue sharing scheme is valuable in vertically 
separated industries in which demand is either uncertain or variable. They also show that 
revenue sharing enables the supply chain to achieve the first best outcome by softening 
retail price competition without distorting the retailer’s stocking decisions. Utilizing the 
panel data collected at 6137 video rental stores in the US between 1998 and 2000, 
Mortimer (2008) compares the stocking levels, rental prices, etc., across different stores 
for the same title as well as across different titles within the same store. In addition, she 
conducts regression analysis to examine the effect of revenue sharing scheme on the 
retailer’s profit. Her analysis shows that the revenue sharing scheme has a small positive 
effect on the retailer’s profit for popular titles, and a small negative effect for less popular 
titles. 
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provide an analytical comparison between revenue sharing contracts and other supply 
chain contracts such as buy-back contracts, price-discount contracts, quantity- flexibility 
contracts, sales-rebate contracts, etc. They show that revenue sharing contracts are 
equivalent to buy back contracts in the newsvendor case and are equivalent to price 
discount contracts in the price-setting newsvendor case. In contrast to Cachon’s approach, 
Øystein Foros et al. (2009) discuss a price-dependent profit-sharing rule and show how 
an upstream firm, by using this rule, can prevent destructive competition between 
downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule, the upstream 
firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic. As a result, 
competing downstream firms will maximize aggregate total channel profit. When 
downstream firms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream firm, 
the same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price 
maintenance. Price-dependent profit sharing may also ensure that the downstream firms 
undertake efficient market expanding investments. The model is consistent with 
observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks. 
2.3   Three most relative papers 
Our departure point will be a prototypical single-product revenue management 
problem first introduced and formalized by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). This 
formulation models realized demand as a Poisson process whose intensity at each point in 
time is determined by a price set by the decision maker. Given an initial inventory, the 
objective is to dynamically price the product so as to maximize expected revenues over a 
finite selling horizon. In the dynamic optimization problem considered in their paper, the 
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designs optimal policies based on this information. 
       The second is a discussion of the demand for operating leasing of aircrafts. Tae Hoon 
Oum et al. (2000) develop a model for the airlines to determine their optimal mix of 
leased and owned capacity, taking into consideration that the demand for air 
transportation is uncertain and cyclical. Empirical results based on the model suggested 
that the optimal demand by 23 major airlines in the world would range between 40% and 
60% of their total fleet, for the reasonable range of premiums of operating lease. For the 
leasing companies, this indicates huge potential of the market given strong forecast for 
the growth of air transportation in the next decade. 
The third inspire our contracts design problem. It is the Cachon and Lariviere (2005)’s 
paper motioned in last section. We get inspiration from the proof process and the 
beautiful results of this paper. Since we have listed it in the previous part, we just ignore 
its details here. 
 
3. Assumptions and basic settings 
3.1   Pricing policy 
When we determine what pricing policy the airline company will take, we have to the 
balance between cost and flexibility. It is obviously the dynamic pricing policy costs 
more than fixed prices list, but gain more revenues. 
    In many settings, dynamic pricing (DyP) can augment or replace traditional capacity-
control RM in which multiple product “classes” are offered at different posted prices, and 
revenues are controlled by allocating capacity to the different price classes over time. 
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Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003). Research on coordinated pricing and inventory 
decisions is surveyed by Chan et al. (2004) and Yano and Gilbert (2003). Broad 
discussions of RM and pricing can be found in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). 
    From the consideration of the cost of changing price, Levy et al. (1997) analyze the 
data of pricing systems of supermarket chains, derived from five different costs of price 
changes. They found that if the costs of price adjustment made the adjustments 
unprofitable they are not implemented. Levy et al. (1998) extend this analysis by 
describing the price adjustment process and involved decisions in more detail. Bergen et 
al. (2003) emphasize that implementing price changes is not costless and offer 
recommendations for a price change strategy at the managerial level. Zbaracki et al. 
(2004) report on the empirical data of costs for price adjustments. These empirical studies 
support the argument that the costs of price changes should be considered when applying 
dynamic pricing policies. 
    Considering the price changing costs, Netessine (2006) analyzes the dynamic pricing 
problem of a single product when only a limited number of price changes are allowed. He 
considers the timing of the price changes in a deterministic environment in cases of 
constraint and unconstraint capacity. This work focuses on an analytic solution for 
maximum expected revenue, whereas our paper looks at the question which price 
changing costs are acceptable under downside risk. 
There are several papers which analyze dynamic and static pricing policies. Gallego 
and van Ryzin (1994, 1997) discuss the numerical results of static pricing in comparison 
to the optimal price. They conclude that for large sized problems with known demand 
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dynamic pricing. Cooper (2002) and Maglaras and Meissner (2006) present results of 
contrasting static and resolving pricing policies. Cooper (2002) provides an example 
showing that resolving policies does not necessarily lead to a better result, whereas the 
numerical results of Maglaras and Meissner (2006) show that its expected revenue is 
superior to static pricing in non-asymptotically settings. However, the policies generally 
assume a long-term perspective when studying expected revenue and a short-term view 
when risk sensitivity might be more important. 
        On the other side, most classical DyP models assume that consumer behavior is 
myopic-a consumer makes a purchase as soon as the price is below his/her valuation for 
the product. At its core, any DyP system is based on a model of demand; that is, a model 
of how demand responds to price changes. A typical one is to formulate demand at each 
point in time as only a function of the price charged at that time, the implicit assumption 
being that customers do not anticipate future prices; that is, they are myopic and buy if 
the current price is less than their reservation price. This model is pervasive; most 
commercial pricing software uses it, and it is common in the research literature too. For 
example, see Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), Feng and Gallego (1995), Federgruen and 
Heching (1999), and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2003). The myopic customer assumption is 
reasonable when customers make impulse purchases and for consumable goods (food, 
beverages, etc.). In addition, it has the considerable practical advantage of leading to 
mathematically tractable models. 
Monopoly models with strategic consumers are more complex, however, and are often 
considered in the deterministic form. For example, Besanko and Winston (1990) present 
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policy for the firm is to lower prices over time in a manner similar to price skimming. Su 
(2007) considers a deterministic demand model with consumers partitioned into four 
segments according to their valuation level and whether they are strategic or myopic. 
Consumers arrive continuously with fixed rates, and the seller looks for the optimal price 
and capacity rationing schedule. The article shows when the seller should use markdowns 
or markups. Aviv and Pazgal (2008) study the optimal pricing of fashion-like seasonal 
goods in the presence of forward-looking consumers who arrive according to a Poisson 
process with constant rate and have declining valuations for the product over the course 
of the season. This work considers the Nash equilibrium between a seller and strategic 
consumers for the cases of inventory-contingent pricing strategies and announced fixed 
discount strategies. Levin et al. (2010) study optimal DyP of perishable items by a 
monopolist facing strategic consumers. This has become the pop trends of principal when 
we consider the use of DyP. 
3.2   Demand 
3.2.1  Demand forecast 
        In order to schedule the fleet size and frequency, together with regarding to the 
development of infrastructure facilities and to reduce the airport risk, it is important for 
the carriers to evaluate and to forecast the volume of air passenger demand in the future. 
Peak demand in passenger flows at the airports, typically determined by seasonal and 
cyclical patterns. Therefore, it is essential to provide more capacity or choose better 
pricing policy to cover demand during the planning horizon and maximum the revenues. 
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demand for air transportation offered by aircraft manufacturers and aviation regulators 
are reasonable and representative of the trends implicit in actual experience. He 
compared forecasts issued by Boeing, Airbus Industry and the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) which has actual experience and the results of a baseline 
model for revenue passenger kilometers (RPKs) demand. Svrcek (1994) has analyzed 
three fundamental measures of capacity, including static capacity that is used to describe 
the storage capability of a holding facility or area, dynamic capacity which refers to the 
maximum processing rate or flow rate of pedestrians and sustained capacity that is used 
to describe the overall capacity of a subsystem to accommodate traffic demand over a 
sustained period. Inzerilli and Sergioc (1994) have developed an analytical model to 
analyze optimal price capacity adjustments in air transportation. From this study, they 
used numerical examples to analyze the behavior of the policy variables (and the 
resulting load factor) under different degrees of uncertainty. Matthews (1995) has done 
measurement and forecasting of peak passenger flow at several airports in the United 
Kingdom. According to his research, annual passenger traffic demand can be seen as the 
fundamental starting point, driven by economic factors and forecasting. While forecasts 
of hourly flows are needed for long-term planning related with infrastructure 
requirements. Hourly forecasts are almost always based on forecasts of annual flows. 
Bafail, Abed, and Jasimuddin (2000) have developed a model for forecasting the long-
term demand for domestic air travel in Saudi Arabia. They utilized several explanatory 
variables such as total expenditures and population to generate model formulation. 
Yamaguchi et al. (2001) have analyzed the economic impact analysis of deregulation for 
  - 21 - airport capacity expansion in Japanese domestic aviation market. According to their 
research, deregulation and airport capacity expansion play significant roles in realizing 
full benefit of aviation market growth. In line of deregulation policy, airport capacity 
expansion was accelerated to meet the growth demand. Swan (2002) has analyzed airline 
demand distributions model. The model explains when the Gamma shape will dominate 
and when the Normal will determine the shape. From his study, he found that Gamma 
shapes are probably better for revenue management and Normal for spill modeling. 
Another study for air travel demand forecasting has done by Grosche, Rothlauf, and 
Heinzl (2007). According to their research, there are some variables that can affect the air 
travel demand, including population, GDP and buying power index. He considered GDP 
as a representative variable for the level of economic activity. 
3.2.2  Demand uncertainty 
    Economists have used a variety of demand models which have been applied in the 
revenue management literature. The problem of demand uncertainty has motivated a 
significant amount of literature in the field of revenue management and pricing. A 
number of different approaches have been introduced to model this uncertainty. Zabel 
(1970)considers two models of uncertain demand: a multiplicative 
model and additive model () ( ttt du p η = ) ( ) ( ) tt du p t η =+ , where is the demand at 
time ,
t d




=− ,i.e. a downward sloping linear demand 
curve, and  t η is assumed to be either exponentially or uniformly distributed with 
[ ] 0 t E η > . Young (1978 ) and Federgruen and Heching ( 1999) generalize the demand 
model to be of the form ( ) ( ) tt tt dp γε δ =+ p , whereγ and δ have first derivatives non 
  - 22 - positive and  t ε is a random term with a finite mean. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994, 1997) 
as well as Bitran and Mondschein( 1997)assume that demand follows a Poison process 
with a deterministic intensity that depends on price and time. Raman and Chatterjee 
(1997) model the stochastic characters of the demand by introducing an additive model 
where the random noise is a continuous time Wiener process. 
The operations research literature treats the presence of data uncertainty in 
optimization problem in several ways. The problem is sometimes solved assuming all 
parameters are deterministic; subsequently sensitivity analysis is performed to study the 
stability of the nominal solution with respect to small perturbations of the data. Stochastic 
programming is used when a probability distribution of the underlying uncertain 
parameters is available, and seeks a solution that performs well and has low probability 
of constraint violation. Robust optimization is also an alternative way to seek an optimal 
solution of a problem when its data is uncertain. 
3.3   Identical leased aircraft size and fixed fleet frequency 
        The recognition and study of the impact of aircraft size and frequency on airline 
demand started with the introduction of the concept of “schedule delay”, first introduced 
by Douglas and Miller (1974), and subsequently applied by Viton (1986). “Schedule 
delay” has two components. 
    The first is frequency delay, which represents the elapsed time between an individual 
traveler’s preferred time and the time of a scheduled flight. The second component is 
stochastic delay, which represents the additional elapsed time when preferred flights are 
fully booked. Douglas and Miller estimated empirical frequency and stochastic delay 
functions by using regression and simulation methods. Frequency delay decreases with 
  - 23 - frequency, while stochastic delay decreases with frequency and aircraft size, and 
increases with demand in the market. For the same service frequency provided by the 
airlines, the larger the aircraft, the higher the probability that a passenger can get a seat on 
a preferred flight and therefore enjoy a more convenient service. The concept of 
“schedule delay” was used in a linear regression model by Abrahams (1983) to estimate 
total air travel demand in a single market. In order to specify “schedule delay”, Abrahams 
used the frequency delay function introduced by Eriksen (1977), and the stochastic delay 
function introduced by Swan (1979). These two functions have the same form as those 
proposed by Douglas and Miller (1974), but the parameter values are different. Thus 
these models capture effects of both frequency and aircraft size. 
Instead of using the negative term“ schedule delay”, Eriksen (1977) and Russon and 
Hollingshead (1989) used the terms “level of service” or “quality of service”-which are 
functions of service frequency and aircraft size in a format similar to “schedule delay”-in 
their models of air passenger travel demand. Hansen (1990) used service frequency, fare 
and flight distance to specify a passenger’s utility function, and built a logic model for 
demand analysis. Norman and Strandens (1990) directly related service frequency to the 
waiting time and cost of passengers, and built a probabilistic air travel demand model 
under the assumption of uniform distribution for desired departure times over a time 
interval. 
    More recently, Coldren et al. (2003) built an itinerary level market share model 
using aggregate multinomial logic methodology. Aircraft size and type, together with 
such variables as fares, time of day, carrier market presence, itinerary level-of-service 
(non-stop, direct, single-connect, or double-connect) and connecting quality, are taken as 
  - 24 - independent variables in the model to measure various itinerary characteristics. 
Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995) and Nako (1992) both applied the logic model to 
study airlines’ demand using the survey data from individual passenger. They both 
investigated the effectiveness of the frequent flyer programs, but did not take aircraft size 
or type as a factor influencing passengers’ choice of airlines. Wenbin Wei and Mark 
Hansen (2005) focus on the analysis of the role of aircraft size on airlines’ demand and 
market share in a duopoly competitive environment at the market level, with one major 
airport in origin and one major airport in destination. They study the roles of aircraft size 
both in an individual airline’s market share and in total air travel demand in the market. 
Not only aircraft size but also the proportion of aircraft capacity available to local 
passengers will be taken into consideration in their research. 
3.4   Other assumptions 
    Need to be fulfilled. 
Comment:  
Should add more reasonable point to explain why choose these assumptions and our 
setting in the model. 
 
4. Basic model 
4.1 Notations  
The system is composed of a carrier and a lessor, and the whole time horizon is 
divided into days (in fact, it should be  days but not limited as days, and here we use 
the days only for simplification).That is, the carrier and the lessor repeat their decision 
process  times in our model. In each decision day, assumed as day , the sequence is as 
N N
N n
  - 25 - this way: acting as the leader, the lessor announces daily rental rates from the day  the 
end of horizon-day  , here we denote the leasing rates vector as , where the nis the 
decision making day. It is obvious that
n
N n L
,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Ll ll l ++ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ .  
After observed the leasing rates vector, the carrier will determine the leasing number 
vector for this and following days, denoted as  ,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Xx xx x ++ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ , where the 
is still the decision making day. Once the leasing number is determined for day , the 
carrier’s total capacity for this day is fixed. Here we use vector to denote the carrier’s 
aircraft capacity, or we call it inventory, at the beginning of day , where n is the 




,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Yy yy y ++ ⎡ = ⎣⎤ ⎦ 0 y the number of carrier 
owned aircrafts. It is sure that at the beginning of the first day, the inventory for each day 
is the same as equal to the carrier’s owned capacity, that 
is 11 12 13 1 0 ... N y yy yy === == ;for the days  , the carrier’s inventory for dayiat the 
beginning of day should be the sum of all the leasing number rented for the day till 
day , that is
1 n >
n i
1 n− 1 2 1, 1, 1, ... n i i i ni ni ni yx x x y x − −− = ++ + = + ,for eachi, in .  ≥
Now we consider what happens in day after the capacity is fixed. The carrier applies 
a dynamic pricing policy for air-tickets based on a seasonally stochastic demand and 
some economic factor, such as oil price. We denote the carrier’s ticket pricing policy at 
day as , which belongs to a set .  is a function of demand, 
n
n n P P n P () nn n PP λ = , n λ is the 
demand at dayn,it is also a function of ,which means the demand can also be expressed 
as . Also, we have to take the notationtto denote the ticket booking point in 
the ticket sale process, and  the carrier’s ticket booking horizon for day ,  . 
n P
() n nn P λλ =
n T n n tT ∈
  - 26 - As for the parameters, here in the model we pay attention to the oil prices and the seats 
number in aircrafts. The oil price for day is , and it is stochastic. In corresponding to 
this, we use to denote the observed oil price in day . We only consider the identical 
aircrafts and the number of seats in each aircraft is .based on these notations, in the 




n , 1, 2... nn n N + + , and it is a 
vector , ,1 ,2 , , ...
T
nn n n n n nn N Zz zz z ++ ⎡⎤ ⎦ ( ) nn n Z qX Y =+ .  = ⎣
The above notations can be listed in the following table: 
Notation list: 
N   The number of decision days. 
n L   The leasing rate vector at day , is the decision making day, 
 
n n
,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Ll ll l ++ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
n X   The leasing number vector at day , is the decision making day, 
 
n n
,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Xx xx x ++ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
n P   Carrier’s ticket pricing policy at day , belongs to a set , n P () nn n PP λ =  
n λ   The demand at day , n ( ) nn n P λλ =  
t  Ticket booking point 
n T   Carrier’s ticket booking horizon for day , n n tT ∈  
n Y   The carrier’s aircraft inventory at the beginning of day , is the decision 
making day,  
n n
,1 ,2 , , ,...
T
nn n n n n n n N Yy yy y ++ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
n O   The oil price in day   n
n o   The observed oil price in dayn 
q  The number of seats in each aircraft 
n Z   The total seats available for day , 1,... nn N + , it is a vector 
  ,1 ,2 , , ...
T
nn n n n n nn N Zz zz z ++ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
 
    In  order  to  describe  the  problem  more clearly, we take the method of back-ward 
analysis in order to get some straightforward conclusions, and then, test them in multiple 
  - 27 - consecutive days’ environment. We first demonstrate the carrier’s and lessor’s problem in 
the last day , and then go to the case of last two days’, for day and day .  N N 1 N −
4.2 Carrier’s profit function: 
Let’s consider the carrier’s problem. We need to add some new notations here to 
describe the carrier’s decision process. As the objective is to maximize the carrier’s profit, 
we use to denote the carrier’s optimal profit at day ;and if given the observed oil 
price , leasing rate vector , and the inventory  at the beginning of day , the 
decision variables relative to the profit are the leasing number
C
N Π N
N o N L N Y N
N X and pricing policy . 
So the expression of the optimal profit can be written as
N P
( ) ,, ,
C
NN N N N N X Po LY Π . If we 
consider the profit at day , we use  N ( ) ,, ,
C
NN N N N N X Po LY π to denote this, and 
still , NN X P is the decision variables.  
    Now we discuss how the profit is created in carrier’s perspective. First,  () NNN R PZ is 
used as the ticket sales revenue at day , given the aircraft seats capacity N N Z . And from 
lots of literatures we know that once the capacity is fixed, the revenue is determined by 
the adjustment of tickets price, so the pricing policy is the variable here. Then we 
consider the cost part, which includes the cost for leasing aircrafts, and operating costs 
for daily use, especially, the oil payment. Here we use  to denote the leasing 





N oIX N N
    So,  the  decision-making  process  should  be acted this way: once the carrier knows 
about the realized oil price  at day , the announced leasing rate and the aircraft 
inventory at the beginning of day , it chooses 
N o N N L
N , NN X P to calculate the maximum of its 
  - 28 - profit to reach the optimal solution for day .In day , the carrier’s profit function 
should be as below: 
N N
() ( ) ,, ,
CT
NN N N N N N N N N NN
T
N X Po LY R PZ L X oIX π =− −  
    And the objective of the carrier at day should be:  N
() ( )
, ,, ,m a x ,, ,
N NN
CC
N NNN NN N NNN NN XP XP oL Y E XP oL Y
λ π ⎡ ⎤ Π= ⎣ ⎦ 
This is only for the last day’s problem, and we can observe from the equation that it is 
a single period’s problem and the decision is not affected by previous decisions. The 
logic we want to use to in this model is that after set up the formulation for last day, we 
will go back to study the problem of two days, day and N 1 N − , and to observe some 
characters for consecutive two days. Then we use back-ward analysis to extend the 
conclusion to multiple days’ case and to check the system’s characters.  
In this way, if we consider any dayn’s problem, 1,2,3... 1 nN = − , now in the day ,the 
carrier’s profit function should be: 
n
() () ( )
1
11 1 1 1 1 ,, , , , ,
n
CT T C
nn n n n n n n n n n n n n nnnn n O XP oL Y RP Z LX o I X E X PO L Y π
+
++ + + + + ⎡ ⎤ =− − + Π ⎣ ⎦  
    Compared with the last day’s case, the new function has one more item, which is the 
expected forward profit that will be produced in the future. And the objective of the 
carrier at day should be:  n
() ( )
, ,, ,m a x ,, ,
n nn
CC
n nn nnn n nn nnn XP X PO LY E X PO LY




nn n n n n ) X PO LY Π is the optimal profit at day ;  n
( ,, ,
C
nn n n n n ) X Po LY π is the profit at day ,, n nn X P is the decision variables; 




is the leasing payment at day ;  n
T
n OI X is the oil payment at day .  n
(
1
11 1 1 1 1 ,, ,
n
C
nn n n n n OEX P O L Y
+
++ + + + + ⎡ Π ⎣ ) ⎤ ⎦ : The expected optimal profit from day to . 
Because the oil prices in the future are stochastic, we have to take expectation operation 
here. 
1 n+ N
Especially, we now have to pay attention to the terminate case and conditions. 
When , the profit function will become:  1 nN =−
() () ( ) ,, , , , ,
N
CT T C
nn n n n n n n n n n n n NN N N N N O XP oL Y RP Z LX o I X E XP OLY π ⎡ ⎤ =− − + Π ⎣ ⎦  
The last item of this equation is just the expectation of the last day’s optimal profit, and 
referring to what we have discussed, it is in fact a single period’s problem, and the 
forward process will be terminated here. This is the reason why we can use back-ward 
analysis to obtain the desired results. 
4.3 Lessor’s profit function: 
Compared with the carrier’s problem, the lessor’s profit function is much simpler. 
Because we don’t consider any operating cost generated in the leasing process for lessor, 




NN NN LL X π =  
And still the optimal profit should be 
( ) ( ) max
N N
LL
NN NN L LE L
λ π ⎡ ⎤ Π=⎣ ⎦ 
  - 30 - As for multiple days, the profit should also be the profit produced in the current day 
plus the profit to go in the future, that is, if we consider any day ’s problem, 
, now in the dayn,the lessor’s profit function should be: 
n






nn nn n n O LL XE L π
+
++ ⎡ ⎤ =+ Π ⎣ ⎦  
And the objective function is: 
( ) ( ) max
n n
LL
nn nn L LE




nn L Π is the optimal profit at day ;  n
(
L












++ ⎡ Π ⎣ : The expected optimal profit from day 1 n+ to .  N
4.4 Two day’s problem: 
        In this section, we will study the problem of two days’ case. That is, if we 
assumeT , now we only consider what will happen when the system’s whole time 
horizon is only composed of the day and day
N =
N 1 N − . We want to use two day’s problem 
to explore how to solve the whole multiple days’ repeating problem. And based on the 
two parties’ decision sequence, we still first consider the carrier’s problem. 
    For day , we have already obtained the following equation for the carrier:  N
() ( )
, ,, ,m a x ,, ,
N NN
CC
N NNN NN N NNN NN XP XP oL Y E XP oL Y
λ π ⎡ ⎤ Π= ⎣ ⎦ 
Where  () ( ) ,, ,
CT
NN N N N N N N N N NN
T
N X Po LY R PZ L X oIX π =− −  
    Now, we should check the characters of the left three items. 







To make the expression more clear, we list the parameters and variables here, that 
are: [ ]
T
NN N Xx = , [ ]
T
NN N Yy = , [ ]
T
NN N Zz = , [ ]
T
NN N Ll = .  







    Where 
() ( ) () ,, ,
TT C
NNN N N N N NN N N N N N N N N
NN N
NN NN NN
RP Z LX o I X XP oL Y RP z
lo
xx x




    In Gallego’s theorem 1, we obtain the conclusion that ( ) NN N N R Pz is concave on , 
which means that
NN z






is decreasing on . Referring to his conclusion, here we 
only need to test the characters of
NN z




















on NN x  . Detailed proof please refers to appendix I. 














enough. And as we take the expectation operation on 
C
N π  to calculate , here we need 









As already pointed out,  
( ) ( )
, ,, ,m a x ,, ,
N NN
CC
N NNN NN N NNN NN XP XP oL Y E XP oL Y
λ π ⎡ ⎤ Π= ⎣ ⎦, 
    Then  
() { } () { } , ,
max , , , max , , ,
N NN N NN
C C
C NN N N N N NN N N N N XP XP N
NN NN NN
EX P o L EX P o L Y
yy y
λ λ
π π Y ⎡ ⎤ Δ ⎡⎤ Δ ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ΔΠ ⎣ ⎦ ==
ΔΔ Δ
 
    Because () ( ) ,, ,
CT
NN N N N N N N N N NN
T
N X Po LY R PZ L X oIX π =− − , 
[ ]
T
NN N Xx = ,  [ ]
T
NN N Yy = , [ ]
T
NN N Zz = , [ ]
T
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π ⎡⎤ Δ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
Δ
⎡⎤ Δ− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =
Δ
⎡⎤ Δ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =
Δ
 
Based on the definition of 
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, ,, ,m a x ,, ,
N NN
CC
N NNN NN N NNN NN XP XP oL Y E XP oL Y
λ π ⎡ ⎤ Π= ⎣ ⎦, 
() () ( )
,, max max
NN NN
NN N N NN N N N N XP XP RP z RP q x y =+ ,  
That is 




N N NN NN NN N N NN NN NN XPR P q x yy R P q x yy ⎡ ⎤ += + ⎣ ⎦  
() () ( ) () () ( )
**
, max 1 1 1 1
NN
N N NN NN NN N N NN NN NN XPRP q x y y RP q x y y ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ++ + = ++ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
() () () () () ( )
**
, max 2 2 2 2
NN
N N NN NN NN N N NN NN NN XPRP q x y y RP q x y y ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ++ + = ++ + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  






is decreasing on NN y ; detailed 
proof please refers to appendix II. 
 
5. Following work  
    The following work includes these items: 
Section 3: add explanations to the model assumptions; 
Section 4: conclude the characters we obtained in the basic model; 
Section 5: propose the forward-liking contract, formulate and prove it; 
Section 6: sensitive analysis and data test; 
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